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Crowding is most likely an important factor in the deterioration of strategy performance, the
increase of trading costs and the development of systemic risk. We study the imprints of crowding
on both anonymous market data and a large database of metaorders from institutional investors
in the U.S. equity market. We propose direct metrics of crowding that capture the presence of
investors contemporaneously trading the same stock in the same direction by looking at fluctuations
of the imbalances of trades executed on the market. We identify significant signs of crowding in
well known equity signals, such as Fama-French factors and especially Momentum. We show that
the rebalancing of a Momentum portfolio can explain between 1–2% of order flow, and that this
percentage has been significantly increasing in recent years.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Crowded trades” or “crowded strategies” are often
heard explanations for the sub-par performance of an
investment or, in more extreme cases, for the occurence
of deleveraging spirals. Although seemingly intuitive,
the concept of crowding has remained elusive and is,
in fact, somewhat paradoxical as every buy trade is
executed against a sell trade of the same magnitude.
Some clarification is therefore needed, and the subject
has recently garnered substantial interest in academic
[2, 6, 10, 11, 20] and applied research [13].
Investors in a purportedly crowded strategy may face
three related predicaments. One is that of increased
competition for the same excess returns, leading to an
erosion of the performance of the strategy. Second is
increased transaction costs: maintaining similar port-
folios leads to similar trade flows. This amplifies the
effective market impact suffered by all investors follow-
ing the same strategy – an effect called co-impact in [7].
This in turn leads to a deterioration of performance even
under normal conditions, see e.g. [12]. Finally, if the
portfolios of different competitors largely overlap, sys-
temic risk may arise as the liquidation of one of these
portfolios can trigger further liquidations and even se-
vere cascading losses for all investors who shared similar
positions [2, 6, 11]. This phenomenon is well exempli-
fied by the Quant Crunch of 2007 [20], which chiefly
affected a certain style of relative value investing, while
it left the market index itself, and therefore long-only
investors, largely unscathed.
Crowding has recently been invoked in the context
of Equity Factor strategies, which have witnessed sub-
stantial inflows in the past decade, and are currently
(as of end 2019) in a relatively severe drawdown. These
strategies are based on persistent anomalies which are
well known to investors, such as Momentum, Value, or
Small Cap strategies [15]. This makes them potentially
crowded and thus interesting to investigate.
The aim of the present study is to investigate the pos-
sible crowdedness of Equity Factor strategies by mea-
suring the correlation of market order flow with the
strength of the trading signal that factor investors hy-
pothetically follow. We use both (i) the total order flow
measured using anonymized microstructure data per-
taining to stocks of the Russell 3000 index and (ii) the
institutional order flow identified thanks to a propri-
etary database. Although these correlations are small,
∼ 1%, they are strongly significant and are seen to have
increased over the recent years. The estimated impact
costs suggest that simple Fama-French factor investing
is close to saturation.
II. DATA AND METRICS
This paper relies on three different datasets: one us-
ing equity prices to construct Equity Factor trading sig-
nals, and two allowing us to quantify trading activity.
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2A. Equity Factor Data
We use standard Fama-French (FF) factors [1, 15],
extended to Momentum [14, 19], defined on the com-
ponents of the Russell 3000 index in a period spanning
from January 1995 to December 2018. Since rebalanc-
ing these FF portfolios is costly, we expect investors to
slow down the bare signal to trade less aggressively. A
conceptually sound [17] model that assumes quadratic
trading costs leads to an exponential slowing down of
the signal. More formally, let us denote by si,t the “sig-
nal” followed by an investor, giving the ideal holding of
stock i on the close of day t. For example, si,t would
be the ranking of stocks according to their past returns
in the case of the Momentum factor. The actual hold-
ings pii,t of the investor is then given by an Exponential
Moving Average (EMA):
pii,t = A
∑
t′≤t
si,t′ exp
(
− t− t
′
D
)
. (1)
The factor A sets the overall risk of the portfolio,
whereas the slowing down time scale D is chosen as to
provide a good compromise between performance and
trading costs. The theoretically expected order flow
from the strategy on day t is thus given by
∆pii,t = pii,t − pii,t−1. (2)
This framework is summarized in Figure 1.
B. Market Microstructure Data
We also use anonymous market data collected by
Capital Fund Management (CFM) covering about
1, 600 US stocks between January 2011 to May 2018.
We process a large majority of trades executed through-
out different market venues. For each stock i and each
day t, we define the trade imbalance as
Itradei,t =
∑
n∈t i,n∑
n∈t |i,n|
, (3)
where i,n is the sign of the n’th trade on stock i, and the
sum extends to all trades taking place during the con-
tinuous trading session of day t. The sign is considered
positive if the trade was executed above the prevailing
mid price, and negative otherwise. Midprice trades are
excluded. Trades are generated by aggressive orders;
Itradei,t hence captures the pressure that they imply.
Similarly, we define the volume imbalance as
Ivolumei,t =
∑
n∈t i,nvi,n∑
n∈t vi,n
, (4)
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Figure 1. The slowing down procedure implemented
in this paper. (Top panel) The original signal si,t, cor-
responding to ideal position before trading costs are con-
sidered. (Middle panel) The slowed down signal pii,t with
slowing down timescale D = 3 months, corresponding to
the desired position when transaction costs are taken into
account. (Bottom panel) The expected order flow ∆pii,t,
submitted by the investor who is targeting the position pii,t.
where vi,n is the volume executed on stock i at trade
n. We do not expect, and in fact do not find, major
differences between the behavior of Itrade and Ivolume,
because volumes are constrained by liquidity available
at the best quotes, and do not fluctuate wildly.
To capture the liquidity in the order book, we average
the volume available on the bid side V bidi,s and the one
available on the ask side V aski,s over N snapshots s taken
every 5 seconds during the continuous trading session
of day t, to calculate, for a given day and stock
V bidi,t =
1
N
∑
s∈t
V bidi,s , (5)
and
V aski,t =
1
N
∑
s∈t
V aski,s . (6)
These allow us to define the daily average order book
imbalance as
Ibooki,t =
V bidi,t − V aski,t
V bidi,t + V
ask
i,t
. (7)
All imbalances above are, by definition, bounded be-
tween -1 and 1.
3C. Metaorder Data
Finally, we also use the Ancerno dataset, a propri-
etary database containing trades of institutional in-
vestors, covering about 10, 000 execution tickets per
day, which corresponds to approximately 10% of the
daily volume traded on the market from January 1999
to December 2014. This data set has been used in sev-
eral academic studies in the past, see e.g. [7–9, 18, 21],
and we refer to those papers for more information on the
data set, as well as descriptive statistics. Using labels
present in the data, we are able to group together dif-
ferent trades that belong to the same metaorder, i.e.
an ensemble of trades with the same client number,
start date, end date, stock symbol, and sign. This al-
lows us to gain more information about the decision-
making process underpinning the order flow. Further-
more, Ancerno trades are representative of institutional
investors, for whom we expect a larger propensity to fol-
low classical equity factors.
Similarly to the above measures of imbalance, we
can define a metaorder trade imbalance Imetai,t and a
metaorder volume imbalance Imetavolumei,t by restricting
the sums over all market trades to metaorders executed
on stock i on day t. For example:
Imetai,t =
∑
m∈t 
meta
i,m∑
m∈t |metai,m |
(8)
where metai,m is the sign of metaorder m on stock i,
and where m runs on the total number of identified
metaorders on stock i and day t.
III. RETURN-IMBALANCE CORRELATIONS
Before diving into the original part of our study,
namely the correlation between imbalances and trad-
ing signal, we re-establish some well known facts
about imbalance-return and imbalance-imbalance cor-
relations.
Figure 2, top panel, shows the lagged correlation be-
tween different imbalance measures and returns, aver-
aged over all the stocks in our dataset. For zero lag,
we recover the usual positive correlations between trade
imbalance and returns, here found to be ≈ 0.2. For pos-
itive lags, i.e. when returns are posterior to imbalances,
correlation is close to zero, indicating that past imbal-
ances have on average no linear predictability on future
returns. On the other hand, past returns are found to be
positively correlated with future trade imbalance, both
for the market-wide Itrade and for the metaorder imbal-
ance Imeta. This is compatible with the strong tempo-
ral autocorrelation of trade imbalance, documented in
[3, 4], and again shown in Figure 2, bottom panel.
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Figure 2. Correlation of imbalances with price re-
turns and autocorrelations. (Top panel) Lagged corre-
lations of all imbalances at day t, with price returns at day
t+ Lag. For Lag > 0 imbalances built with public informa-
tion have no correlation with future returns as expected. For
Lag = 0 we recover the well known “mechanical” correlation
between contemporaneous trade imbalance and returns. For
Lag < 0 we observe how today’s imbalances are correlated
to past returns. (Bottom panel) We show the time auto-
correlation of all imbalances introduced in the text. While
price returns are only weakly autocorrelated, the submission
of orders, and in particular metaorders, are strongly auto-
correlated, with a power-law decay Lag−γ of the autocorre-
lation function (see [3, 4]). We find γ ≈ 0.8 for market-wide
trades and γ ≈ 0.5 for metaorders.
We also mention that we find a clear positive correla-
tion between metaorder imbalances Imeta and market-
wide imbalances Itrade (not shown). This has to be
the case since metaorders themselves contribute to the
anonymous market flow. We also find a negative corre-
lation of a few percent between metaorder imbalances
and book imbalances. This can be understood by ar-
guing that metaorders are more likely to be executed
when there is enough available liquidity, and vice-versa:
the execution of large metaorders induces more liquidity
to be revealed in the order book (a phenomenon called
liquidity refill in [4]).
4IV. DYNAMICAL CORRELATIONS
A. Momentum
Let us now turn to the study of correlations between
different kinds of imbalances and factor trading, start-
ing with the standard Momentum Factor [14, 19] for
which we see the most significant results. As explained
above, we first slow down the signal using an EMA,
and then take the derivative to calculate the trades that
would follow from rebalancing.
In the top panel of Figure 3 we show the correla-
tion of anonymous market imbalances with the expected
Momentum order flow for different values of the slow-
ing down parameter D, averaged over all stocks in the
dataset. The grey stripe denotes the significance band
of the correlations, obtained by reshuffling the time se-
ries (in blocks of 6 months in order to preserve the auto-
correlation structure) and calculating the standard de-
viation of the obtained correlations over 200 reshuffled
samples. We find a significant correlation between trade
and book imbalances and the expected order flow. This
correlation is negative for trade imbalance and positive
for order book imbalance, with absolute maxima & 1%
for D around 3–4 months. This timescale is of the same
order of magnitude as the autocorrelation time of the
momentum signal, and thus quite reasonable.
Although the results in the top panel of Figure 3 are
highly significant, the sign of the correlations is some-
what confusing. Naively, one would be tempted to argue
that Momentum investors execute their trades with ag-
gressive market orders. This should lead to a positive
correlation between the trading signal and trade imbal-
ance, whereas we observe this correlation to be nega-
tive. At this stage, one can come up with two opposite
interpretations:
• What we see are in fact aggressive orders by mean-
reversion traders. However, this is quite unlikely
since mean-reversion is not a profitable strategy
on the time scale of months, but rather on the
time scale of a few days only.
• Momentum trades are predominantly executed
using limit orders, thus contributing to a posi-
tive correlation with the order book imbalance,
as observed in the top panel of Figure 3. This
is compatible with the behavior of popular bro-
ker execution algorithms that chiefly use passive
orders. It also resonates with [16], which states
that 80 % of the volume executed by a major fund
manager in the factor trading industry is through
limit orders.
The analysis of metaorders helps bolster our interpre-
tation. In the middle panel of Figure 3 we see that
both metaorder and metaorder volume imbalance show
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Figure 3. Conditional correlations of all imbalances
with slowed down momentum. (Top panel) Average cor-
relation of market-wide trade imbalances and of book imbal-
ance, with the Momentum trading signal slowed down with
different timescalesD, on the x axis. (Middle panel) Average
correlation between metaorder imbalances and the Momen-
tum trading signal, slowed down with different timescales
D (Bottom panel) Average correlations between the daily
close to close price returns and the Momentum trading sig-
nal, slowed down with different timescales D. The latter
correlation displays a qualitatively similar behaviour, but it
is 10 times smaller (∼ 0.2%) than the correlation between
imbalances and trading signal.
a clear positive correlation with the Momentum trading
signal, with a similar time scale D around 4–6 months.
Note that the sign of metaorders (to buy or to sell) re-
ported by the data provider is not sensitive to whether
they are executed actively or passively. Since most
metaorders in the database correspond to order flow
of institutionals who most likely engage in Momentum
strategies, we can safely conclude that the inverted cor-
relation observed in the top panel of Figure 3 corre-
5sponds to Momentum trading using passive orders.
We have performed a series of tests for the robust-
ness of the observed correlations. These are quite stable
across stocks, regardless of liquidity and tick size. The
same analysis with different slowing down mechanisms,
or using the long (or short) only component of Momen-
tum yields qualitatively similar results in all cases.
We also show the correlations between the daily close-
to-close price returns and the Momentum trading sig-
nal, which we can compute on the Russell 3000 from
1996 to 2019, i.e. with much more data than for im-
balance correlations. This correlation is considerably
smaller: its maximum is around 0.2%, to be compared
with 1.2% for the imbalance correlation.1 Although
quite small, this correlation is important as it can be
used to estimate the impact cost incurred by Momen-
tum traders. It should be compared with the correlation
between the slowed down position pit and the returns,
which by definition gives the average profit of the strat-
egy, and is found to be ≈ 0.1%. Assuming a quadratic
cost model gives a trading cost equal to one half of the
instantaneous impact. These numbers therefore suggest
that Momentum has become only marginally profitable:
this is a crowded trade, for which co-impact has driven
profits to zero. Let us stress that this is not the case for
other implementations of Momentum that are, accord-
ing to the same measure, distinctively less crowded and
therefore still profitable (at least at the time of writing).
We can in fact prove directly that Momentum crowd-
ing has increased in the recent years, by computing the
maximal imbalance/signal correlation computed every
year, found for D ∈ (2, 4) months for market-wide data
and D ∈ (3, 6) months for metaorder data. The re-
sults are shown in Figure 4 and are quite consistent
over the whole period. Whereas the maximum correla-
tion is noisy but quite stable for metaorders from 1999
to 2014, market-wide data that we collect up to 2018
reveals a clear upward drift since 2012, possibly related
to the increase of the popularity of factor strategies.
B. Other Factors: HML & SMB
So far we discussed results for Momentum only. We
also explored Fama-French factors, such as “HML” (also
called “Value”), comparing the price of a stock to its
book value, and “SMB”, i.e. buying small cap stocks and
1 A simple, back-of-the-envelope estimation based on a linear
impact model allows one to explain the observed factor 5 be-
tween return/signal and imbalance/signal correlations, taking
into account the fact that the unconditional standard devia-
tion of Ivolume is ∼ 0.1. However, one would rather expect a
square-root impact and not a linear impact [7], so it is at this
stage not clear how to reconcile these observations.
selling large cap stocks [1]. Our methodology closely
follows that of the previous section. In Figure 5 we
show our results for HML and SMB. Our results for
market-wide imbalances for these two factors are sim-
ilar to those obtained for momentum – although less
significant for SMB. This is expected, given that the
longer holding period of these strategies induces a much
smaller rebalancing activity [5]. For metaorder imbal-
ance, on the other hand, correlations are barely signifi-
cant.
On the other hand, the time evolution of the market-
wide imbalances with the HML or SMB signals is too
noisy to confirm that crowdedness in these factors has
also increased in the recent years.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this empirical study we have shown that crowding
of equity factors can be quantitatively elicited through
correlations between real supply/demand imbalances
(proxies of market participants trading in the same di-
rection) and the rebalancing order flow that would re-
sult from tracking slowed-down equity factors. Our re-
sults, particularly significant for Momentum, show that
such a strategy is indeed crowded, resulting in rather
poor profitability. Further, our method allows one to
confirm that crowding on equity factors (at least on
Momentum) has, as claimed and feared by many, sig-
nificantly increased over the past few years.
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Figure 4. Time evolution of the correlation between imbalances and Momentum signal. (Left panel) Maximum
(in absolute value) of the trade imbalance and book imbalance correlation with the Momentum trade signal versus time,
since 2011. One observes a clear upward trend, suggesting that Momentum trading has become more and more crowded.
(Right panel) Maximum (in absolute value) of the metaorder imbalance correlation with the Momentum trade signal versus
time, from 2000 to 2014. The sign and absolute values of these correlations, albeit noisy, are quite stable in time.
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Figure 5. Conditional correlations of imbalances
with slowed-down HML and SMB. We again show, as
a function of D, the correlation between different types of
imbalances and the trading signal originating from the HML
and SMB factors. Because these factors have a significantly
longer intrinsic time scale, the signal is weaker and shifted to
larger values of D. Note that the correlation of the trading
signals to metaorder imbalances is barely significant, and
points in the opposite direction.
to redistribute them, even in aggregate form. Requests
for this commercial dataset can be addressed directly
to the data vendor. See www.ancerno.com for details.
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